

FRANCO ESTEBAN CATTANEO

Contact Information

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Personal Information

Citizenship: Spanish, Argentine Residence Permit, Sex: Male

Undergraduate Studies

Master of Science in Economics, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, 2012-2013

Bachelor of Science in Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2008-2012

Visiting Student in Economics, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2010

Graduate Studies

Ph.D. in Economics, Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, 2013-Present

Thesis Title: "*Essays in Empirical Industrial Organization*"

Expected Completion Date: Summer 2019

References

Prof. Michelle Sovinsky
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Prof. Hidenori Takahashi
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Prof. Emanuele Tarantino
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Teaching and Research Fields

Research field: Empirical Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics

Teaching fields: Microeconomics, Econometrics

Research Experience

2017-18. Research assistant to Prof. Michelle Sovinsky

Teaching Experience

Spring 2019. Business Economics II (M.Sc. in Management), teaching assistant

Fall 2018. Business Economics I (M.Sc. in Management), teaching assistant

Spring 2018. Empirical Industrial Organization (M.Sc.), teaching assistant

Spring 2016-17. Competition Policy and Antitrust Regulation (B.Sc.), teaching assistant

Fall 2015-16. Empirical Industrial Organization (Ph.D.), teaching assistant

Fall 2014. Intermediate Microeconomics (B.Sc.), teaching assistant

Professional Activities

Conferences and workshop

2018: GESS Research Day, ENTER Jamboree (Toulouse), 2nd Bonn-Mannheim Ph.D. Workshop (Bonn), XXXIII Jornadas de Economía Industrial (Barcelona), MaCCI Competition and Regulation Day, 1st MaCCI-EPoS-CREST Workshop (Mannheim), Econometric Society Winter Meeting (Naples), XLIII Simposio de la Asociación Española de Economía (Madrid)

2017: Ph.D. Industrial Organization Group (U. Mannheim)

Departmental Service

2015-17: Student Coordinator of the ENTER Seminar Exchange Program (U. Mannheim)

2015-19: Member of the Gender and Diversity Committee - GESS (U. Mannheim)

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships

2018-19 Fontana Fellowship

2013-15 GESS Doctoral Scholarship

2012 Catalunya Caixa Scholarship, full tuition waiver for master studies.

Research Papers

Downstream Competition and Exclusive Dealing – **Job Market Paper**

I empirically investigate the role of downstream competition in the use of exclusive dealing and quantify its effects in the formation of the car retailing networks. I estimate a model where exclusivity impacts both supply and demand, and dealers choose which brand to offer in a strategic manner. These choices frame product and brand availability in the market and the retail networks for manufacturers. In my model, dealers have incentives to add more brands in order to sell a wider set of products, but their interest to differentiate from local rivals limits this option. Moreover, manufacturers could raise costs anticompetitively to deter dealers from selling products of rival brands. I analyze the potential for this foreclosing channel by estimating fixed cost differences between exclusive and non-exclusive stores using moment inequalities. I find that multi-dealing has an average cost advantage between -€10,000 and €620,000. These numbers indicate that downstream competition, instead of anticompetitive motives, explains a more substantial part of the prevalence of exclusive dealing in the market.

Work in Progress

Signal of Entry and Division of Markets (Joint with Hidenori Takahashi and Yuya Takahashi)

We study the roles of the threat of entry and firms' entry decisions in the context of procurement auctions for infrastructure projects. The procurer requires that interested firms request for a construction plan to participate in an auction, and the request for a plan becomes common knowledge. Reduced-form evidence suggests that firms react to the threat of entry rather than the actual entry of their rivals. We construct a structural model of entry with information request where firms need to request a plan to be able to participate in an auction, and the request for a plan can be used as a threat. A firm faces a trade-off when choosing whether to request for a plan or not. On the one hand, requesting an additional plan expands the set of auctions that a firm could bid for. On the other hand, requesting an additional plan signals its rival firms that it is less likely to bid for the auctions it has already requested plans for. We examine the impact of information disclosure on firms' behavior by shutting down the path through which firms affect the entry of their rivals by plan request. Our study sheds light on the role of information design in public procurement.

Other Skills

Programming Languages/Software: Matlab, R, Python, Stata, Microsoft Office, C

Languages: Spanish (Native), English (Fluent), Catalan (Fluent), German (Fluent), Italian (Beginner)