Franco Esteban Cattaneo

Contact Information

University of Mannheim
Department of Economics
L 7, 3-5 – Room 3.17 (3rd floor)
68161 Mannheim

Curriculum Vitae

Welcome to my webpage

I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of Mannheim. My research interests are in Empirical Industrial Organization and Applied Microeconomics.

I am on the job market and I will be available for interviews at:

Working Papers

Downstream Competition and Exclusive Dealing - Job Market Paper

Abstract I empirically investigate the role of downstream competition in the use of exclusive dealing and quantify its effects in the formation of the car retailing networks. I estimate a model where exclusivity impacts both supply and demand, and dealers choose which brand to offer in a strategic manner. These choices frame product and brand availability in the market and the retail networks for manufacturers. In my model, dealers have incentives to add more brands in order to sell a wider set of products, but their interest to differentiate from local rivals limits this option. Moreover, manufacturers could raise costs anticompetitively to deter dealers from selling products of rival brands. I analyze the potential for this foreclosing channel by estimating fixed cost differences between exclusive and non-exclusive stores using moment inequalities. I find that multi-dealing has an average cost advantage between -€10,000 and €620,000. These numbers indicate that downstream competition, instead of anticompetitive motives, explains a more substantial part of the prevalence of exclusive dealing in the market.

Work in Progress

Signal of Entry and Division of Markets with Hidenori Takahashi and Yuya Takahashi

Abstract We study the roles of the threat of entry and firms' entry decisions in the context of procurement auctions for infrastructure projects. The procurer requires that interested firms request for a construction plan to participate in an auction, and the request for a plan becomes common knowledge. Reduced-form evidence suggests that firms react to the threat of entry rather than the actual entry of their rivals. We construct a structural model of entry with information request where firms need to request a plan to be able to participate in an auction, and the request for a plan can be used as a threat. A firm faces a trade-off when choosing whether to request for a plan or not. On the one hand, requesting an additional plan expands the set of auctions that a firm could bid for. On the other hand, requesting an additional plan signals its rival firms that it is less likely to bid for the auctions it has already requested plans for. We examine the impact of information disclosure on firms' behavior by shutting down the path through which firms affect the entry of their rivals by plan request. Our study sheds light on the role of information design in public procurement.